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Abstract
This paper develops an applied general equilibrium model to explore various tax cuts
aimed at combating unemployment and raising labor supply. The model calibrates modern
labor-market theories on wage setting, job matching, labor supply and labor demand on
Dutch data. It represents the core of a larger applied general equilibrium model for the
Netherlands called MIMIC. Simulations reveal that targeting in-work benefits at the low
skilled is the most effective way to cut economy-wide unemployment. However, targeting is
likely to damage the quality and quantity of labor supply. Tax cuts in the higher tax
brackets boost the quantity and quality of formal labor supply but are less effective in
reducing unemployment and in raising unskilled employment and female labor supply.
 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Many European countries suffer from high structural unemployment, especially
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among the unskilled. Various reforms of labor-market institutions and the tax and
social insurance systems have been put forward to fight this unemployment. These
proposals include, in addition to reducing social benefits and minimum wages,
cutting social insurance premiums and payroll taxes on low-skilled work,
introducing wage subsidies for the long-term unemployed, and providing in-work
benefits (see Snower and De la Dehesa, 1996; Haveman, 1996; Sørensen, 1997).
The latter proposals aim to enhance low-skilled employment without seriously
damaging the incomes of transfer recipients.
At the same time, the aging of the population implies that the increasing burden
of social insurance benefits paid to the elderly must be financed by a relatively
small number of workers. The rising ratio between the number of inactive people
collecting social insurance benefits and the labor force is a growing cause for
concern. To mitigate this trend, many EU countries aim at stimulating labor
supply. Indeed, the low labor-force participation of women and the elderly in
many EU countries leaves substantial scope for raising labor supply. Proposals to
raise labor supply include cutting marginal tax rates, reducing tax benefits to
households with a non-participating partner, and decreasing early retirement
benefits.
This paper develops an applied general equilibrium model to explore various tax
policies aimed at combating unemployment and raising labor supply. The model
focuses on adequately describing wage formation, labor supply and demand, and
the process of job matching between vacancies and the unemployed looking for a
job. By including elements of wage bargaining and costly job matching, the model
describes equilibrium unemployment in terms of the structure of the tax system
and the features of social insurance. The key parameters in wage formation are
estimated from Dutch time series data.
The model developed in this paper represents the core of a larger applied
general equilibrium model for the Dutch economy, called MIMIC. The latter
model is designed so as to help Dutch policymakers in investigating the structural
labor-market implications of changes in the systems of taxation and social
insurance. Compared to the small model, MIMIC contains more heterogeneity,
more economic mechanisms and an elaborate description of the actual tax and
social insurance systems in the Netherlands. This institutional detail makes
MIMIC especially relevant for policy making because actual policy proposals
typically involve particular details of the tax and social insurance systems.
The contribution of this paper is four-fold. First, it calibrates modern theories of
the labor market, such as wage bargaining and job matching, on Dutch data. In
doing so, it accounts for some of the important institutional details of the Dutch
labor market and the Dutch tax system. Second, the paper provides empirical and
theoretical support for real wage resistance in the Dutch economy so that labor
taxes are not fully borne by workers in the long run. While the estimated wage
equation indicates that real wage resistance is present in the Dutch economy, we
provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon in terms of an informal
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sector in which those without a job in the formal sector may work. As its third
contribution, the paper uncovers a number of major trade-offs that often escape
policy discussions. These trade-offs involve the objectives of cutting unemploy-
ment in general and low-skilled unemployment in particular, stimulating labor
supply in general and the labor-force participation of women in particular,
enhancing the accumulation of human capital, and establishing an equitable
income distribution. To illustrate, tax reforms that are effective in fighting
unemployment are typically not the most helpful in boosting labor supply. As its
final contribution, this paper illustrates the value-added of employing a larger
model for policy analysis by comparing the results from the small aggregated
model with those from MIMIC. In particular, MIMIC is able to analyze a broader
scope of policy instruments, yields disaggregated information relevant for policy
makers – including information on the equity /efficiency trade-off – and contains
more economic mechanisms. Accordingly, compared to the small model, MIMIC
reveals a number of additional trade-offs.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the aggregated
model that is used in Section 3 to explore a number of tax cuts aimed at reducing
unemployment and raising labor supply. Section 4 discusses briefly how MIMIC
departs from the aggregated small model and investigates the structural impact of
tax policies in MIMIC. Section 5 concludes.
2. MINI-MIMIC: an AGE model for an open economy
This section develops a small general equilibrium model with similar features as
the MIMIC model. As in MIMIC, the key elements of this so-called MINI-MIMIC
model are labor supply and demand, wage formation and job matching.
2.1. Firm behavior
The economy consists of two types of domestic firms. For each type i 5 u,s, a
fixed number of N symmetric firms produce commodities according to a lineari
j jproduction function Y 5 h L , where superscript j denotes firm j 5 1 . . . N . Thei i i i
two types of firms differ with respect to the labor skill they adopt in the production
j jprocess, namely unskilled labor (L ) or skilled labor (L ). The fixed parameter hu s i
measures the productivity of labor skill i.
Firms set prices on markets that are characterized by monopolistic competition.
jProfit maximization implies that the output price of firm j of type i, P , is set as ai
mark-up over marginal costs:
W1 ij ]]]P 5 i 5 u, s j 5 1 . . . N (1)i j ih1 2 ´ ii
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where W represents the wage costs of (un)skilled labor (i.e. the producer wage),i
j j j j jand ´ ; 2 (≠P /≠Y )(Y /P ) . 0 denotes the negative of the inverse pricei i i i i
j jelasticity of demand for Y . Profits (P ), which are due to the mark-up, accrue toi i
the owners of the firm, who are residents of the home economy:
j j j j
P 5 P Y 2 W L i 5 u, 2 j 5 1 . . . N (2)i i i i i i
Commodities produced by labor skill i 5 u,s are aggregated into a composite
commodity Y , with an ideal price index, P :i i
N h / (h21)i
(h21) /h1 /h jY 5 O a Y i 5 u, s (3)F Gi ij i
j
N 1 / (12h)i
12hjP 5 O a P i 5 u, s (4)F Gi ij i
j
where h denotes the substitution elasticity between commodities produced by firms
jof type i 5 u,s. From (3), we derive that the elasticity ´ in the mark-up factor ini
(1) is independent of firm j and type i and inversely related to the substitution
elasticity between the different commodities, i.e. ´ 5 1/h. Hence, the mark-up in
(1) is small if commodities are close substitutes for each other.
The optimal allocation of Y over the two composite commodities – demanded
by domestic households, foreign households and the government – is derived from
maximizing a homothetic CES sub-utility function:
1 /f (f 21) /f 1 /f (f 21) /f f / (f 21)Y 5 [b Y 1 (1 2 b) Y ] (5)s u
where f stands for the elasticity of substitution between the two composites
commodities and b represents a share parameter. From the first-order condition,
we arrive at the following expression for the optimal allocation between the two
composite commodities:
2fY Ps s
] ]5 (6)S DY Pu u
Expression (6) can be interpreted as an implicit demand function for skilled and
unskilled labor; the demand for Y and Y implicitly determines the demand foru s
skilled and unskilled labor as a function of the price indices P and P that areu s
determined by the respective wage rates for skilled and unskilled labor (see (1)
and (4)). The parameter f can thus be interpreted as the substitution elasticity
between skilled and unskilled labor.
The ideal price index of the composite domestically produced good is a CES
aggregate of the prices of the two composite commodities:
1 2f 1 2f 1 / (1 2f )P 5 [bP 1 (1 2 b)P ] (7)y s u
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Aggregate profits are determined by the sum of the profits of all firms:
Ni
j




The economy is populated by three types of households: skilled households,
unskilled households and capitalists. The latter households do not supply labor but
receive profit income from their ownership of the domestic firms. The other two
household types supply labor. The number of hours worked per household is the
only endogenous component of labor supply because participation decisions are
exogenous. In particular, M households of each skill type maximize utility (U )i i
subject to a budget constraint and a time constraint, where subscript i 5 u,s
denotes the skill type of the household. Utility features a private consumption
bundle (C ), leisure (V ) and public consumption (G) as its arguments. This latteri i
variable enters utility in an additively separable way, i.e. U 5 u(C ,V ) 1 h(G).i i i
Hence, changes in public consumption do not directly affect private household
behavior. The CES function u(.) is homothetic in its two arguments. If a household
is not rationed on the labor market, its budget for consumption commodities is
determined by labor income, i.e. (1 2 TA )(1 2 D )W S 5 P C , where (1 2 D )Wi i i i c i i i
is the before-tax wage, TA denotes the average tax rate on gross labor incomei
(including pay-roll taxes), S stands for labor supply, and P represents the ideali c
price index of the consumption bundle. The before-tax wage rate differs from the
producer wage because of hiring costs (D ) faced by employers (see Subsectioni
2.4). In most matching models, individual worker /firm bargaining determines the
incidence of these hiring costs. In our model, in contrast, hiring costs affect
collective bargaining between employers organizations and unions (see Subsection
2.3).
Labor supply is given by S 5 1 2V because the time endowment is normalizedi i
to unity. Unrestricted optimization yields the following expression for total labor
supply of each skill type:
2s(1 2 TM )(1 2 D )W (1 2 TA )(1 2 D )Wi i i i i i
]]]]]] ]]]]]]S 5 M Y 1 1 DF S D S DGi i i P Pc c
i 5 u, s (9)
where s denotes the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in
household utility, D depends on the parameters of the utility function and TMi i
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1stands for the marginal tax rate on labor income. Expression (9) reveals that a
higher average tax rate (TA ) stimulates labor supply through the income effect byi
depressing the real consumer wage (1 2 TA )(1 2 D )W /P . A higher marginal taxi i i C
rate harms labor supply through the substitution effect. A higher real consumer
wage (W /P ) or lower hiring costs (D ) raise labor supply if the substitution effecti c i
dominates the income effect, i.e. if s .1. Labor supply thus depends only on
wages, taxes and hiring costs; unemployment does not directly affect the
incentives to supply labor, e.g., through the discouraged worker effect. Indeed,
labor supply is determined by a conventional labor supply model with exogenous
participation.
2.2.2. Consumption
Involuntary unemployment implies that some skilled and unskilled households
are rationed in their labor supply. The rationed households do not receive wage
income but collect unemployment benefits. Aggregate household consumption is
restricted by the sum of aggregate after-tax labor income (including the income of
those who are employed in the search activities of the employers, see Subsection
2.4), income from unemployment benefits, and aggregate profit income (P ):
P C 5O [(1 2 TA ) W L 1 B U S ] 1 P (10)c i i i i i i
i
where L denotes economy-wide demand for labor type i (excluding labor involvedi
in search activities), B represents the (net) unemployment benefit for labor type i,i
and U ; 1 2 L /S stands for the unemployment rate of type i. Unemployment isi i i
thus measured in terms of the difference between labor supply and labor demand
(in terms of hours). Indeed, some workers are fully employed; these workers are
able to sell their entire notional labor supply given by expression (9). The other
workers are involuntary unemployed; they are not able to sell any of their labor.
Households spend their entire income on a consumption bundle (C) consisting
of two aggregate goods with an ideal price index P (see Fig. 1). One aggregatec
good is a CES aggregate of domestic commodities produced by skilled workers
and domestic commodities produced by unskilled workers (see Subsection 2.1).
The other aggregate good is a composite of imported commodities with an ideal
price index P . Domestic and foreign commodities are imperfect substitutes. Them
optimal choice between these two aggregate commodities is derived from
optimization of a homothetic CES subutility function, C 5 c(C , C ), where Cm y m
denotes aggregate private demand for foreign goods and C stands for aggregatey
private consumption of domestically produced goods. The optimal allocation of
consumption over the two goods is given by:
1The average tax may depend on the producer wage (see Subsection 2.5). Hence, TM may differi
from TA .i
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Fig. 1. The utility tree in MINI-MIMIC.
2kC Pm m
] ]5 (11)S DC Py y
where k denotes the substitution elasticity between the two commodities and Py
stands for the ideal price index of domestic production, defined in (7).
2.3. Wage formation
For each skill type, wages are determined by a right-to-manage model in which
an employers organization and a trade union of each skill type bargain over wages
while employers determine employment. In particular, collective wage bargaining
involves the maximization of the following Nash function:
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a 12aMax V 5 L G 0 , a , 1 i 5 u, s (12)i i i
Wi
where L 5 P Y 2 W L denotes the utility of the employers organization andi i i i i
1 / 2 1 / 2ˆG 5 L [W (1 2 TA )(1 2 D ) 2 W ] stands for the utility of the union. Thei i i i i i
parameter a represents the relative bargaining power of the employers organiza-
tion. The utility of the union depends on the level of employment and the surplus
from working, which is the real consumer wage minus the reservation consumer
ˆwage, denoted by W . The union thus does not take into account the workers’i
preferences for leisure.
After substituting the expressions for L and G into Eq. (12) and deriving thei i
first-order condition for the Nash bargaining solution, we arrive at the following
wage equation:
ˆx W1 i
]]]]]1 x P h2 i i(1 2 TM )(1 2 D )i i
]]]]]]]]W 5 i 5 u, s (13)i x (1 2 TA )1 i
]]]] 1 x2(1 2 TM )i
where x ; a 1 1/2(1 2 a) /(1 2 ´) and x ; 1/2(1 2 a). Expression (13) reveals1 2
that the wage strikes a balance between the threat points of both bargaining parties.
If the employers organization dominates bargaining (a 5 1 so that x 5 0), the2
union is driven back to its threat point and the after-tax wage equals the
reservation wage. The wage increases if the union exerts more bargaining power,
i.e. if a becomes smaller. Since a wage contract will be concluded only if the
maximum after-tax wage offer ((1 2 TA )(1 2 D )P h ) exceeds the minimumi i i i
ˆwage claim (W ), expression (13) implies that a higher marginal tax ratei
unambiguously moderates wages. At a given average tax rate, a rise in the
marginal tax rate implies that the government absorbs a larger share of a wage
increase. Hence, increasing wages becomes less attractive for the bargaining
parties (see also Hersoug et al., 1986).
Instead of looking for another job on the official labor market, the employee
may seek work in the informal sector. Accordingly, the reservation consumer wage
Ŵ amounts to a weighted average of the opportunity consumer wage in the officiali o bˆ ˆlabor market (W ) and that in the informal sector (W ):i i
o bˆ ˆ ˆW 5 b W 1 (1 2 b )W 0 # b # 1 i 5 u, s (14)i w i w i w
The opportunity consumer wage in the official labor market depends not only on
]
the expected consumer wage in other jobs, (1 2 TA )(1 2 D )W , but also on thei i i
unemployment benefit because a laid-off employee generally spends some time in
unemployment before finding another job:
oˆ ¯W 5 U B 1 (1 2 U )(1 2 TA )(1 2 D )W i 5 u, s (15)i i i i i i i
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where the proportion of time spent unemployed before finding an alternative job is
assumed to equal the unemployment rate.
The informal labor market, in which no taxes are levied, consists of home
production and the black labor market. Informal labor productivity increases with
labor productivity in the formal sector (h ), because technological progress in thei
formal sector enhances labor productivity also in the informal sector. Because
output of the informal sector is a perfect substitute for commodities consumed
from the formal economy, the informal output price is directly related to the
2formal consumer price (P ):c
b
Ŵ 5 gh P i 5 u, s (16)i i c
By substituting (15) and (16) into (14) and using the equilibrium condition
]
W 5W , we arrive at the following wage equation:i i
Pc
]]]]]]log W 5 log h 1 log P 1 log 1 1uF S DGi i i P (1 2 TM )(1 2 D )i i i
x (1 2 TA )1 i
]]]]2 log 1 1 [1 2 b (U R 1 (1 2 Y ))] (17)F Gw i i ix (1 2 TM )2 i
for i 5 u, s where u ; (1 2 b )gx /x and R ; B /(1 2 TA )(1 2 D )W stands forw 1 2 i i i i i
the replacement rate, defined as the net unemployment benefit as a ratio of the
consumer wage. Expression (17) implies that, at a given coefficient of progression
(1 2 TM ) /(1 2 TA ), a higher tax rate unambiguously increases the real produceri i
wage so that taxes are not fully absorbed by workers in terms of lower consumer
wages. The intuition behind this real wage resistance is that taxes raise the relative
attractiveness of working in the untaxed informal sector, thereby strengthening the
3bargaining position of the union in the formal sector.
Another implication of Eq. (17) is that the wage effects of the replacement rate
and unemployment rate are related. If unemployment is low, spells of unemploy-
ment are only short. Hence, the unemployment benefit level exerts only a small
impact on the alternative consumer wage in the official sector. At the same time,
the influence of the unemployment rate on wages diminishes with the level of the
replacement rate, becoming zero if the replacement rate equals one.
Graafland and Huizinga (1996) estimated Eq. (17) in non-linear form on Dutch
time series data. They found that, on average for the sample period, the positive
elasticity of the average tax is six times (0.6) as large in absolute value than the
2The model does not include value-added taxes, which would exert the same effect on wages as
proportional income taxes do (see Graafland and Huizinga, 1996).
3If the informal sector does not impact the reservation consumer wage (b 5 1 and thus u 50), taxesw
affect the wage outcome only through the coefficient of progression (1 2 TM ) /(1 2 TA ). Accordingly,i i
at a constant replacement rate, proportional taxes are fully borne by the workers in terms of lower
consumer wages.
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negative elasticity of the marginal tax rate (20.1). The elasticity of hiring costs
equals the sum of the elasticities of the marginal and average tax rates, i.e. 0.5.
Hence, at constant unemployment and replacement rates, the incidence of both a
higher tax wedge (by simultaneously increasing average and marginal tax rates)
and higher hiring costs is split equally between employers and employees in terms
of, respectively, higher producer wages and lower consumer wages. The replace-
ment rate and the unemployment rate feature elasticities of 0.3 and 22,
respectively (on average over the sample period).
The empirical finding that proportional labor taxes are split between workers
and employers contrasts with the well-know result of Layard et al. (1991) that
these taxes are fully borne by workers in the long run. As noted above, the
empirical evidence on real wage resistance for the Dutch economy is consistent
with a theoretical model in which those without a job in the formal sector can take
up employment in the untaxed informal sector. In that case, the fall-back position
of the unions in collective bargaining depends in part on untaxed informal incomes
so that higher taxes exert only a relatively small negative impact on the negotiation
position of the unions. The presence of real wage resistance makes the tax system
an important determinant of the natural rate of unemployment.
2.4. Job matching
In each period, a fixed proportion of the employed, v, involuntarily quit their
job. These job quits give rise to vacancies (Vl ) which, in a steady-statei
equilibrium, are equal to:
vLi
]Vl 5 i 5 u, s (18)i zi
where z ; Ml /Vl denotes the rate at which vacancies are filled and Ml stands fori i i i
the number of job matches of skill type i.
To fill vacancies, employers have to hire new employees through a costly search
process of matching vacancies with unemployed workers. Hiring costs associated
with this matching process (D ) are related to the ease with which vacancies arei
filled (z ) and the labor involved in search activities:i
ni
]D 5 i 5 u, s (19)i zi
where n measures the hiring costs for each new employee.i
The matching process between unemployed and vacancies is described by the
following Cobb–Douglas function:
1 / 2 1 / 2Ml 5Vl (U S ) i 5 u, s (20)i i i i
Expression (20) reveals that a lower unemployment rate reduces the number of job
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matches, relative to the number of vacancies. Accordingly, hiring costs in (19)
increase, thereby raising the producer wage in (17) and reducing consumer wages.
2.5. Public institutions
Government behavior is largely exogenous. In particular, the government
collects public revenues from taxing labor incomes. These revenues are used to
finance expenditures on (net) unemployment benefits and public consumption.
Public consumption, G, features the same composition as private consumption and
thus exhibits the same ideal price index, P . The government budget is balanced:c
P G 5O (TA W L 2 B U S ) (21)c i i i i i i
i
The marginal tax rate and the unemployment benefit are uniform for skilled and
4unskilled labor, i.e. TM 5 TM 5 TM and B 5 B 5 B. The average tax rateu s u s
differs from the marginal tax because the government allows for a tax credit that
may differ among household types (F ). The average tax rate for each type of labori
is described by:
Fi
]]TA 5 TM 2 i 5 u, s (22)i W Li i
The unemployment benefit (B) is indexed to average wages in the following way:
B 5 b R*W(1 2 TA)(1 2 D) 1 (1 2 b )QW(1 2 D) (23)u u
where
W L 1 W L W L TA 1 W L TAu u s s u u u s s s
]]]] ]]]]]]W 5 TA 5L 1 L W L 1 W Lu s u u s s
W L D 1 W L Du u u s s s
]]]]]D 5 (24)W L 1 W Lu u s s
The variables W(1 2 TA)(1 2 D) and W denote the average consumer wage and
average producer wage, respectively. Expression (23) allows for two alternative
indexation rules. If b 5 1, net unemployment benefits are indexed to realu
consumer wages. In that case, the parameter R* can be interpreted as the fixed
average replacement rate. Hence, tax cuts do not affect the average replacement
rate. If b 5 0, unemployment benefits are indexed to before-tax wages. In thatu
case, cuts in the average tax burden for workers, TA, reduce the average
replacement rate, R ; B /W(1 2 TA)(1 2 D) 5 Q /(1 2 TA)(1 2 D).
4The uniform unemployment benefit implies that the replacement rate for skilled workers (with a
higher than average wage rate) is smaller than that for unskilled workers (with a lower than average
wage rate).
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2.6. The foreign sector
Analogous to consumption of domestic households, the allocation of foreign
consumption over domestically produced and foreign produced goods depends on
the terms of trade, i.e.:
2jPy
]X 5 (25)S Dy Pm
where X represents demand for domestically produced commodities by foreigny
countries and j denotes the export elasticity. With less than infinite price
elasticities for export and import demand, domestic policies may change the terms
of trade.
The market for domestically produced goods is in equilibrium. Hence, aggregate
supply of domestic goods (Y) equals aggregate demand for domestically produced
goods by domestic households (C ), the government (G ) and foreigners (X ), i.e.:y y y
Y 5 C 1 G 1 X (26)y y y
Balance of payments equilibrium is found by combining the aggregate profit Eq.
(8), the economy-wide household budget constraint (10), the government budget
constraint (21) and goods-market equilibrium (26):
P (C 1 G ) 5 P X (27)m m m y y
where G represents the demand by the government for foreign goods.m
3. Tax policies in MINI-MIMIC
3.1. Calibration
MINI-MIMIC is calibrated in such a way that it reflects the major features of
the aggregate data of the Dutch economy in 2018, the year in which the simulation
results with MIMIC in Section 4 are evaluated. The data and parameters are
presented in Table 1. Aggregate labor supply by skilled households is 5.2 million
labor years of which 4.9 million labor years are employed in production. The
unemployment rate thus amounts to 5.8% of the skilled labor force. For the
unskilled, the unemployment rate is larger; it amounts to 9.5% of the unskilled
labor force. Annual income of skilled households exceeds that of unskilled
households by around 50%. Prices in the base year are normalized to unity. About
50% of the total value of domestically produced goods is consumed in the home
country; the rest is exported abroad. In the home country, private households
consume 60% of GDP, with the rest consumed by the government. The replace-
ment rate for unskilled workers is 0.9 while the replacement rate for skilled




S 55.2 L 54.9 U 50.058s s s
S 52.1 L 51.9 U 50.095u u u
bAnnual incomes
(1 2 D )W 5 261 W 5 297s s s
(1 2 D )W 5 179 W 5 193u u u
cNational accounts
W L 5 1455 Y 5 2500 X 5 1250s s y
W L 5 367 C 5 1523u u
P 5 378 G 5 977
Institutional data
TM 5 0.60 F 5 57s
TA 5 0.56 F 5 23s u
TA 5 0.54 R 5 0.65u s
TA 5 0.55 R 5 0.90u
Parameters
h 5 5.0 k 5 1.5 b 5 0.94 r 5 0.1w
f 5 1.5 s 5 4.0 v 5 0.05
D 5 10.9 g 5 0.29 y 5 0.15s
D 5 9.7 a 5 0.97 j 5 2.00u
a Millions of labor years.
b Thousands of DFl.
c Billions of DFl.
workers is substantially lower, namely 0.65. The marginal tax rate in the initial
equilibrium is 0.6 while the average tax rate is somewhat lower, namely 0.56 for
skilled workers and 0.54 for unskilled workers. Hence, the initial tax system is
mildly progressive.
The elasticities of the wage equation are derived from the estimates of Graafland
and Huizinga (1996) discussed in Subsection 2.3. The substitution elasticity
between skilled and unskilled labor is derived from Draper and Manders (1996)
and set at 1.5. The export elasticity of 22 is consistent with estimates by Draper
(1996). The uncompensated wage elasticity and the income elasticity of labor
supply are based on micro-econometric research on labor-supply behavior of
Dutch citizens and set at 0.15 and 20.05, respectively (Theeuwes and Woittiez,
1992; Van Soest, 1995).
3.2. Simulation results
Table 2 reports the simulation results of five tax cuts of 0.5% GDP, financed by
an equivalent ex-ante reduction in public consumption. The model is closed by
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Table 2
Five tax cuts in MINI-MIMIC, financed by an ex-ante reduction in public consumption of 0.5% GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prices Percentage changes
Producer wage
– Skilled 20.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6
– Unskilled 20.3 20.3 20.6 21.3 0.0
Consumer wage
– Skilled 0.8 0.8 0.5 20.3 0.8
– Unskilled 0.7 0.9 0.2 1.4 2.3
Production price 20.2 20.1 20.1 20.2 1.1
Consumption price 20.1 0.0 20.1 20.1 0.6
Volumes
Private consumption 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 21.8
Exports 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 22.5
Imports 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 20.6
Production 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 22.7
Employment 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.7 22.6
– Skilled 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 23.5
– Unskilled 0.6 0.6 1.0 2.1 20.7
Labor supply (hours) 0.2 20.2 20.2 20.4 24.1
– Skilled 0.2 20.1 20.2 0.0 23.7
– Unskilled 0.2 20.3 20.4 21.3 25.4
Ratios Absolute changes
Unemployment rate 20.3 20.4 20.6 21.0 21.6
– Skilled 20.2 20.2 20.3 20.1 20.3
– Unskilled 20.4 20.7 21.2 23.1 24.3
Replacement rate 0.0 0.0 21.1 21.1 21.2
– Skilled 0.0 0.0 21.1 21.0 21.1
– Unskilled 0.1 20.1 21.2 22.9 23.2
aAverage tax 20.6 20.6 20.7 20.7 20.7
– Skilled 20.6 20.6 20.6 0.0 20.1
– Unskilled 20.6 20.9 20.9 23.3 23.5
Marginal tax 20.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2
bPublic consumption 20.3 20.4 20.3 20.1 20.4
a Weighted average tax rate on hourly wages.
b Closure rule, in % of GDP.
(1) Lower marginal tax rate (benefits indexed to consumer wages). (2) Higher tax credit for all
households (benefits indexed to consumer wages). (3) Higher tax credit for all households (benefits
indexed to producer wages). (4) Higher tax credit for unskilled workers (benefits indexed to producer
wages). (5) Higher tax credit for all workers, higher marginal tax rate, skilled workers break even ex
ante (benefits indexed to producer wages).
changes in public consumption. Hence, the ex-post effect on public consumption
can be interpreted as the long-run budgetary costs of the tax reduction.
The first two experiments reported in the first two columns of Table 2 assume
that unemployment benefits are indexed to after-tax wages (i.e. b 5 1). Hence, theu
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average replacement rate is constant. These experiments involve a reduction in the
marginal tax rate for all workers and an increase in the tax credit for skilled and
unskilled workers with the same absolute amount. In the other three experiments,
presented in the last three columns of Table 2, unemployment benefits are indexed
to gross wages (i.e. b 5 0). In that case, tax cuts reduce the replacement rate. Inu
the third column, we explore the effects of an increase in a uniform tax credit for
all workers. The fourth column shows the effects of an increase in the tax credit
only for unskilled workers. This latter experiment can be interpreted as the
introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for unskilled workers. In
contrast to the EITC in the US, however, the EITC targeted at unskilled workers
explored in the fourth column does not raise the marginal tax burden on hours
worked in the phase-out range because it is based on hourly wages rather than
annual incomes. To explore the effects of an EITC that is phased out on the basis
of higher annual incomes, the fifth column presents the effects of an alternative tax
reduction that is targeted at the unskilled. In particular, this experiment increases
the tax credit for all workers. At the same time, it raises the marginal tax rate in
such a way that skilled workers break even ex ante. Whereas the average tax
burden for skilled workers thus remains unchanged, the average tax burden on
unskilled workers declines since these households benefit relatively more from the
tax credit and suffer less from the higher marginal tax rate than skilled workers do.
3.2.1. Labor supply
Only the cut in marginal tax rates boosts aggregate labor supply through the
substitution effect (see the first column of Table 2). The three tax credits in the
second, third and fourth columns of Table 2 do not affect marginal tax rates on
hours worked. Hence, the substitution effect is absent and a positive income effect
reduces labor supply. Targeting the tax cuts to the unskilled implies a relatively
large positive income effect for this group. Accordingly, unskilled labor supply
declines substantially in the targeting case (see the fourth column of Table 2). If
the tax credit is targeted on the basis of annual incomes, it sharply raises the
marginal tax rate on hours worked. In that case, therefore, labor supply drops
substantially on account of both an income effect and an adverse substitution
effect (see the fifth column of Table 2).
3.2.2. Unemployment
Economy-wide unemployment drops in all cases due to a lower average tax
burden. Even if the average replacement rate remains constant (i.e. if benefits are
linked to after-tax wages as in the first two columns of Table 2) does aggregate
unemployment decline. The reason is that, in addition to the replacement rate, the
average tax rate enters the wage Eq. (17). This implies that lower taxes are not
fully absorbed in higher after-tax wages but partly benefit employers in terms of
lower wage costs. The lower wage costs raise labor demand. The drop in
unemployment is largest if net unemployment benefits are linked to producer
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rather than consumer wages. In that case, a lower replacement rate strengthens the
wage moderating effect of a lower average tax burden.
The drop in the aggregate unemployment rate is most substantial if tax cuts are
targeted at the unskilled (see the fourth and fifth columns of Table 2). The main
reason is the relatively low wage rate for unskilled labor. This implies that cutting
the average tax rate for unskilled labor is relatively cheap in terms of budgetary
costs. Another reason is that targeted tax reductions reduce the replacement rate
for the unskilled (see below). The wage equation in (17) implies that a lower
replacement rate is particularly effective at high unemployment rates. Since the
unemployment rate for the unskilled exceeds that for skilled workers, tax
reductions targeted at the unskilled are relatively effective in cutting unemploy-
ment rates. In the fifth column of Table 2, the effect on unemployment on account
of the lower average tax burden and the reduction in the replacement rate is
reinforced by the wage moderating effect of a higher marginal tax rate. As
discussed in Subsection 2.3, a higher marginal tax rate discourages unions from
bargaining for high wages, thereby reducing unemployment.
Unskilled unemployment declines substantially more than skilled unemployment
if only average tax rates are cut while marginal tax rates are either kept constant or
increased. The reason is three-fold. First, a larger uniform tax credit implies a
larger drop in the average tax rate of the unskilled than in that of the skilled
because the tax credit represents a relatively large share of the relatively low
incomes of the unskilled. The larger drop in the average tax rate implies a stronger
moderating impact on the wage costs of unskilled labor (see Eq. (17)). Second, the
unskilled unemployed do not fully share in this larger drop in the average tax rate
of the unskilled because their unemployment benefits are linked to average wages.
Hence, even if benefits are linked to (average) consumer wages does the
5replacement rate for unskilled labor decline. If benefits are linked to producer
wages, the replacement rate for unskilled labor drops more substantially than the
replacement rate for skilled labor because unskilled workers benefit from a larger
cut in average tax rates. These effects on the relative replacement rates are much
stronger if the cut in the tax credit accrues only to unskilled labor (see the fourth
and fifth columns in Table 2). The final reason for the relatively large drop in
unskilled unemployment is the high initial unemployment rate of the unskilled.
This makes the equilibrium unemployment rate of the unskilled especially
sensitive to reductions in the replacement rate.
3.2.3. Employment
The cut in marginal tax rates boosts employment through both the channel of
higher labor supply and the channel of lower unemployment. The other tax cuts
reduce both labor supply and unemployment. If the marginal tax rate is kept
5The average replacement rate does not change in this case.
A.L. Bovenberg et al. / Journal of Public Economics 78 (2000) 193 –214 209
constant, the decline in unemployment dominates the fall in labor supply. Hence,
employment expands in these cases. However, if the marginal tax rate is increased,
the adverse effect on labor supply exceeds the decline in unemployment so that
employment falls.
The expansion in aggregate employment is strongest if marginal tax rates are
reduced (the first column of Table 2) or if tax cuts are targeted at the unskilled
without raising the marginal tax rate (the third and fourth columns of Table 2).
With lower marginal tax rates, higher labor supply accounts for a substantial part
of the expansion in employment. With targeting the unskilled on the basis of
hourly wages, lower unemployment explains the substantial increase in employ-
ment. This suggests a trade-off between raising labor supply and cutting
unemployment. Cutting marginal tax rates stimulates labor supply but targeting tax
cuts at the unskilled reduces unemployment most. This trade-off is illustrated also
in fifth column of Table 2 where the combination of a lower average tax rate and a
higher marginal tax rate reduces both unemployment and labor supply.
Unskilled employment rises most substantially if a tax credit is targeted at the
unskilled on the basis of hourly wages. This is despite a rather sharp decline in
unskilled labor supply. Hence, also here, a trade-off emerges between stimulating
labor supply and fighting unemployment. Nevertheless, targeting the unskilled on
the basis of hourly wages raises unskilled employment as the positive employment
effects on account of lower unemployment dominate the negative employment
effects associated with lower labor supply. If the unskilled are targeted on the basis
of annual incomes, in contrast, the adverse effect on labor supply dominates the
decline in unemployment. Hence, unskilled employment falls.
4. The MIMIC model
4.1. Structure of MIMIC
MIMIC departs from MINI-MIMIC by incorporating more institutional detail,
economic mechanisms, disaggregation, and heterogeneity. These extensions make
MIMIC a more appropriate instrument for analyzing actual policy proposals in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, more disaggregation and heterogeneity allow for a
better empirical foundation of several parts of the model, such as labor supply,
labor demand and production.
An important feature of MIMIC is a disaggregated household model aimed at
adequately describing the impact of the statutory rates of taxation and social
security premiums on labor supply and the income distribution. In particular, the
model accounts for heterogeneity in household composition, educational level,
wages, and preferences for leisure. Incorporating this heterogeneity allows the
model to explore the various trade-offs facing policymakers, including that
between equity and efficiency.
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To model the effects of high marginal tax rates on the economy, MIMIC
endogenizes on-the-job training and models the interaction between the formal and
the informal economy. The latter consists of the black economy and household
production. On the labor market, contractual wages are determined by both
skill-specific and macro-economic factors. Indeed, the wage Eq. (17) is specified
both on the macro-economic level and for three skill types, namely, unskilled, low
skilled and high skilled labor. MIMIC introduces heterogeneity in the matching
process which allows the modeling of the adverse impact of high minimum wage
costs and high reservation wages on the efficiency of matching process. In
particular, low-productivity matches may fail because they do not meet the
minimum productivity standard of the employer or the reservation wage of the
unemployed.
A final distinctive feature of MIMIC is that it contains several public
institutions, including the Dutch personal income tax system in 1998. For a more
elaborate description of MIMIC, see Gelauff and Graafland (1994) and Bovenberg
et al. (1998).
4.2. Simulations with MIMIC
To illustrate the value-added of using the MIMIC model in analyzing tax
policies, we employ MIMIC to explore similar experiments as in Subsection 3.2.
The simulation results are presented in Table 3. In each experiment, the ex-ante
reduction in tax revenues is 0.5% of GDP, financed by an equivalent reduction in
public consumption. Adjustments in public consumption balance the government
budget ex post.
The simulations with MIMIC reveal the same trade-off between the objectives
of cutting unemployment and raising labor supply. Indeed, reducing marginal tax
rates is the most effective way to raise labor supply (in terms of hours), while
increasing income differentials between low-skilled workers and the low-skilled
unemployed is most effective in fighting unemployment.
In addition to this, MIMIC finds that lower marginal tax rates boost not only the
quantity but also the quality of labor supply. In particular, by widening the income
differentials between low and high labor incomes, lower marginal tax rates
stimulate the incentives for on-the-job training and thus raise labor productivity
and the accumulation of human capital. Furthermore, MIMIC reveals that a cut in
marginal tax rates stimulates especially the labor supply of partners who feature a
relatively high elasticity of labor supply. Indeed, the labor supply elasticities in
MIMIC are based on empirical estimates for the Netherlands which suggest that
married women typically feature a much larger elasticity of labor supply than men
do. MINI-MIMIC does not use this disaggregated information on labor supply
behavior.
An across-the-board tax credit that applies to both workers and transfer
recipients increases the replacement rate in MIMIC, which is defined as a weighted
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Table 3
Economic effects of five tax cuts in MIMIC, financed by an ex-ante reduction in public consumption of
0.5% GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prices Percentage changes
Producer wage
– unskilled 20.5 20.2 21.0 22.8 21.7
– low skilled 20.3 20.1 20.5 21.2 21.0
– high skilled 20.3 20.1 20.3 20.6 20.4
Production price 20.4 20.1 20.5 20.6 20.3
Consumption price 20.3 20.1 20.4 20.4 20.2
Volumes
Private consumption 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.7
Exports 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.4
Imports 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2
Production 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.4
Employment 0.6 0.1 0.8 1.2 0.7
– unskilled 0.7 0.1 1.4 3.9 2.4
– low skilled 0.6 0.1 0.9 1.1 1.0
– high skilled 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.3
Labor supply (persons) 0.1 20.1 0.5 0.2 1.6
Labor supply (hours) 0.2 20.1 0.0 0.0 20.3
– breadwinners 0.0 0.0 20.1 20.2 20.2
– partners 0.5 20.4 0.7 0.7 0.9
– single persons 0.2 20.2 20.2 20.1 21.2
Black labor (hours) 20.4 0.4 0.2 2.0 0.6
Human capital (index) 0.1 0.0 0.1 20.4 20.3
Ratios Absolute changes
Unemployment rate 20.2 20.1 20.5 20.8 20.7
– unskilled 20.3 20.2 20.8 21.7 21.3
– low skilled 20.3 20.2 20.5 20.9 20.8
– high skilled 20.2 20.1 20.4 20.7 20.8
Replacement ratio 20.1 0.3 20.7 21.3 20.5
– unskilled 20.1 0.3 21.2 25.0 22.7
– low skilled 20.1 0.3 20.7 20.5 0.0
– high skilled 20.1 0.3 20.6 20.5 0.0
aAverage tax 20.6 20.4 20.9 20.9 21.1
aMarginal tax 20.8 0.0 20.2 1.8 1.2
bPublic consumption 20.3 20.5 20.2 20.1 20.2
a Weighted average of micro tax burdens of the employed on hourly wages.
b Closure, in % of GDP.
(1) Lower marginal tax rate in all three income tax brackets (by 1.0% points). (2) Tax credit for all
households (of DFl 250). (3) Fixed tax credit for workers only (of DFl 500). (4) EITC for low hourly
wages (of DFl 2500), phased out between 120% and 180% of the minimum wage. (5) EITC for low
annual labor incomes (of DFl 1200), phased out between 120% and 180% of the minimum wage.
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average of the replacement rates of different household types. The reason is that
MIMIC incorporates micro data on income distributions which reveal that the
unemployed benefit relatively more from a tax credit than those in work because
the unemployed collect relatively low incomes. The associated higher replacement
rate implies that a uniform tax credit exerts a less favorable effect on unemploy-
ment in MIMIC than in MINI-MIMIC.
As in MINI-MIMIC, cutting unemployment in MIMIC primarily requires
widening the gap between labor incomes and transfer incomes in unemployment.
This may be accomplished through in-work tax benefits (see the last three columns
of Table 3). Indeed, MIMIC reveals that these tax benefits can reduce unemploy-
ment significantly by moderating wage costs and by facilitating job matching.
In-work benefits can become more effective in reducing unemployment if they are
targeted at low skilled workers, who suffer from the highest unemployment rates.
The costs and benefits of targeting are illustrated with the effects of an EITC
that amounts to 4% of annual labor income in a phase-in range up to the statutory
minimum wage and that is phased out between 120% and 180% of the minimum
6wage (see the fifth column of Table 3). This policy is effective in cutting
unemployment, especially among the low skilled, and in raising female labor-force
participation. Breadwinners and singles, however, reduce their labor supply, in part
due to the higher marginal tax rate in the phase-out range. On balance, the
reduction in labor supply dominates the positive effect on the participation rate of
7partners. Hence, aggregate labor supply (measured in hours) drops. Targeting the
EITC thus reveals a trade-off between, on the one hand, raising labor supply and,
on the other hand, fighting unemployment.
This trade-off between cutting unemployment and raising labor supply (in
hours) can be mitigated by linking the EITC to hourly wages rather than annual
incomes. Indeed, the Dutch government has proposed such an EITC; workers who
earn the hourly minimum wage and hold a full-time job are eligible for the full
EITC but the credit is reduced proportionally for workers who work less than a
full-time job. A comparison between an EITC that depends on annual incomes and
an EITC that depends on hourly wages reveals a trade-off between increasing the
participation rate of partners and reducing the unemployment rate for the low
6This experiment in MIMIC is not directly comparable with the experiment with MINI-MIMIC
reported in the fifth column of Table 2. In particular, MIMIC explores an EITC that is phased out at a
rate of around 6% over an income range between 120% and 180% of the minimum wage. Hence,
workers who earn an income outside this phase-out range do not face a higher marginal tax rate. The
experiment in MINI-MIMIC, in contrast, involves an increase in the marginal tax rate of approximately
6% for all workers, a lower average tax rate for the unskilled and a constant average tax rate for skilled
workers.
7Empirical evidence on the impact of the American EITC on labor supply by Eissa and Liebman
(1996) and Scholz (1996) support the positive participation effect. Eissa and Liebmann, however, find
no significant effect of the EITC on hours worked. Model simulations by Dickert et al. (1995) and
Browning (1995), in contrast, indicate that the EITC typically reduces hours worked.
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skilled (compare the fourth and fifth column of Table 3). In particular, an EITC
that depends on hourly wages is more effective in cutting low-skilled unemploy-
ment. This is because, with the same budget for tax relief, more tax benefits can be
provided to full-time workers with low hourly wages. At the same time, however,
small part-time jobs with hourly wages above the minimum wage benefit less from
tax relief. This makes the instrument less effective in raising the labor-force
participation of partners. Another trade-off involves the quality versus the quantity
of labor supply. Compared to an EITC that depends on annual incomes, an EITC
that depends on hourly wages enhances the quantity of labor supply (in hours)
because additional hours worked do not reduce the credit. However, it more
seriously harms the quality of labor (in terms of human capital). This is because
the marginal tax rate on a higher hourly wage increases more substantially, thereby
damaging the incentives for training. Another drawback of this variant of the EITC
is that it relies on additional information (namely the number of hours worked)
that is vulnerable to fraud. Indeed, the black economy expands substantially.
5. Conclusions
This paper has stressed that policymakers face various trade-offs in designing
tax reforms aimed at enhancing the functioning of labor markets. Indeed, different
objectives imply different priorities for how tax cuts should be structured. The
model simulations suggest that in-work benefits are an effective instrument to fight
economy-wide unemployment. These benefits reduce unemployment even more if
they are targeted at unskilled workers, in part because the gap between labor
income and transfer income is smallest for these workers. Hence, widening this
small gap produces the largest pay-off in terms of reducing unemployment.
However, by decreasing the gap between low and high labor incomes through a
more progressive tax system for workers, a targeted EITC reduces the hours of
labor supplied. This trade-off between cutting unemployment and raising labor
supply (in hours) can be mitigated by linking the EITC to hourly wages rather than
annual incomes. Doing so, however, raises the marginal tax burden on higher
hourly wages, thereby discouraging the accumulation of human capital and
stimulating the black economy. Cutting marginal tax rates raises the quantity and
quality of labor supply but is less effective in reducing unemployment and raising
low-skilled employment.
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